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"STATE ACTION" IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
In 1871 the United States Congress created a statutory
cause of action for violation of the newly enacted fourteenth
amendment.' One element of such a cause of action is "state
action"; a plaintiff must be able to prove that the wrongdoer
acted "under color of any ' 2 state statute, ordinance or custom.
The line between activities once viewed as private and those
involving "state action" has become more blurred as the state
has become more involved in a variety of activities that were
once viewed as private.3 Where a private person is found to be
acting "under color of" state law or custom4 the constitutional
limitations which are placed on the government are placed on
the private person.
In Shelley v. Kraemer' the court stated:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
It was enacted on Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
2. In discussing the meaning of "state action" and "under color of" state law the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[in cases under § 1983, 'under color' of
law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under
the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, n. 7 (1966).
Accord, Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers, 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
3. E.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (utility); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (a fraternal organization); Perez v. Sugar-
man, 499 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974) (a private child care institution); Smith v. YMCA of
Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972) (a non-profit association). See also
Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974); Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional
Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 So. CAL. L.
REV. 1003 (1973); Comment, State Action in the Health Field, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1188;
Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69 (1967); Antoun, State Action: Judicial
Perpetuation of the State/Private Distinction, 2 OHIo NORTH. L. REV. 722 (1975); Note,
State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).
4. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167 (1970) where the Court stated
that for a custom or usage of a state to constitute "state action" it must have the force
of law by virtue of the persistent practices of state officials.
5. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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109 U.S. 3 (1883), the principle has become firmly embedded
in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however dis-
criminatory or wrongful.'
The United States Supreme Court has refused to establish
an absolute test for determining whether a private person's
actions have become so entwined with the state that they
constitute "state action," and it has repeatedly stated that
"[olnly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct be at-
tributed its true significance." 7 The Supreme Court may have
missed the irony in its recent statement that "the question
whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the one hand, or
'state action' on the other, frequently admits of no easy an-
swer." Of course, when the state is obviously involved with the
conduct there is little question that the "state action" require-
ment is met.' But when the involvement has not been obvious,
the attempts of courts to determine whether "state action" is
present have appropriately been labeled a "magical mystery
tour.""' The attorney who seeks some predictability" in the
"state action" area will not enjoy the mystery tour. The discus-
sion below will examine Seventh Circuit cases which have con-
sidered the question of whether "state action" is present. The
various arguments which plaintiffs have used in attempting to
establish "state action" will also be examined. In some situa-
tions, cases from other circuits will assist in analyzing the Sev-
enth Circuit cases. Finally the standards which Seventh Cir-
cuit courts used in determining whether "state action" was
6. Id. at 13.
7. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
8. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974).
9. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975) (prison guards); Spence v.
Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974) (agents and employees of state hospital); Roberts
v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1974) (police officer); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484
F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) (state's attorney).
10. Comment, State Action in the Health Field, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1188.
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that predictability is what the law is about.
He stated that "[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in
JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION 279 (1953).
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present will be set forth and analyzed. To assist in analysis, the
cases have been categorized according to the central theme of
the plaintiffs claim for "state action" as follows: State Regula-
tion, State Financial Support, State Enforcement and Public
Function.
State Regulation
In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company'2 the Sev-
enth Circuit was faced with the question of whether the
defendant power company's procedure for termination of plain-
tiff consumer's service was proscribed by section 1983. The
plaintiff's complaint alleged that he had paid his $9.89 bill in
cash without receiving a receipt. He paid subsequent charges
but refused to pay the alleged arrearage. The power company
then notified him that his service would be disconnected. Since
the proposed termination was consistent with disconnect rules
which had been approved by the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission, the plaintiff argued that the defendants, the
power company and the individual commissioners of the Public
Service Commission, were acting "under color of" state law.
The court stated that in order to make its holding more
precise, it would discuss "(a) the claim against the commis-
sioners and then (b) the claim against the power company."' 3
The court acknowledged that when the commissioners
acted in their official capacity they acted "under color of' state
law within the meaning of section 1983 and then directed its
attention to the constitutional issue of whether on behalf of the
state the commissioners deprived the plaintiff of due process
of law. 4
The circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
12. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). Courts have
been faced with the question of whether a utility's actions constitute state action on
many occasions. Compare, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
(state action not present); Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 441 F.2d
1116 (9th Cir. 1971) (state action not present) with Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio,
Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973) (state action present); Ihrke v. Northern States Power
Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972) (state action
present); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (state
action present); Hattell v. Public Service Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972) (state
action present). See also Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations
of Utility Services for Nonpayment, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1477 (1973).
13. 466 F.2d at 646.
14. Id.
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plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the power company's
challenged action was not "under color of" state law within the
meaning of section 1983. The court viewed the action of the
power company as private even though the power company
contributed state support through tax payments, had to com-
ply with state regulatory controls, and was granted a limited
monopoly status. The court said:
The "under color of' provision encompasses only such
private conduct as is supported by state action. That support
may take various forms, but it is quite clear that a private
person does not act under color of state law unless he derives
some "aid, comfort, or incentive," either real or apparent,
from the state. Absent such affirmative support, the statute
is inapplicable to private conduct. (footnotes omitted).15
In addition to holding that the "under color of" provision
requires affirmative state support by way of "aid, comfort or
incentive, either real or apparent" the court stated that the
support must be "significant, measured either by its contribu-
tion to the effectiveness of defendants' conduct, or perhaps by
its defiance of conflicting national policy.""
15. Id. at 654-55, qu6ting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 212 (1970)
(Mr. Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting). For an unenlightening discussion of
what constitutes "aid, comfort or incentive" see Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990, 993-
94 (7th Cir. 1974). The court in Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th
Cir. 1973) reaffirmed its decision in Lucas that detailed regulation by the state of a
private person does not constitute state action.
16. Id. at 656. In footnote 40 the court cited to Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972), wherein the Supreme Court stated "that where the impetus for the discrimina-
tion is private, the state must have significantly involved itself with invidious discrimi-
nation . . . in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition." This reasoning was first articulated in Powe v. Miles, 407
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). In Powe, the plaintiff had argued that New York's regulation
of educational standards in private schools constituted state action. Responding to this
argument for the court, Judge Friendly wrote:
It overlooks the essential point-that the state must be involved not simply with
some activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff
but with the activity that caused the injury. 407 F.2d at 81.
In discussing the Lucas decision one commentator stated that the court's view under-
scored the need for something more than a perfunctory listing of contacts between the
state and private persons in order to establish state action. Note, State Action: Theo-
ries for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
656, 690 (1974).
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) the Court noted
that "the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the state itself." The Court went on to cite Burton v.
[Vol. 59
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The court then applied the "significant" "affirmative state
support" test to the power company's proposed termination of
plaintiff's service. In two respects the state had supported the
power company's action of termination: 7 First, the state had
authorized the power company to enter private property under
certain circumstances.' This state support, however, was not
deemed "significant." Second, the state provided monopoly
protection for the power company. In order to determine
whether the monopoly protection was "significant" the court
evaluated the state's support to determine whether it brought
section 1983 into play. In other words, to meet the "significant"
test, the state's monopoly protection must contribute to the
effectiveness of the power company's conduct.'" The court
found that the defendant's monopoly status would not signifi-
cantly affect the plaintiff's dispute with the power company.
"[T]he monopoly factor does not provide the necessary ingre-
dient of added state support of private conduct-the termina-
tion of electric service-which will transform an issue of state
regulatory policy into a federal civil rights case under section
1983."2"
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) for the proposition that the state's
involvement may not be immediately obvious and that a detailed inquiry may be
necessary to determine whether such a nexus is present. The court did not adopt the
exact language of either Powe, supra, or Moose Lodge, supra that the state had to be
involved in the activity that caused the injury. It would seem that the nexus could be
satisfied even if the state were not directly involved in the challenged activity. For
example, the state may be so involved in the actions of the-private person that their
activity is seen as "joint." See Burton, supra at 725. In such a case the nexus is satisfied
even if the state is not directly involved in the challenged act. See also text accompany-
ing notes 86 to 93 infra.
17. Justice Douglas would probably consider this approach by the Lucas court as
"fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 362 (1974) (Justice Douglas dissenting). Justice Douglas said:
[Tihe dispositive question in any state-action case is not whether any single
fact or relationship presents a significant degree of state involvement, but rather
whether the relevant factors compel a finding of state responsibility. Jackson,
supra at 360.
Justice Douglas would find the aggregate of the factors upon which a claimant relies
controlling rather than have a court dismiss each factor individually as being insuffi-
cient to support a finding of state action.
18. The court concluded that if the electric company had entered private property
to terminate power, as they were authorized to do by the state, a different question
would have been presented. However, the court determined from the record that the
power company could terminate plaintiff's service by throwing a switch or disconnect-
ing wires.
19. See note 16, supra.
20. 466 F.2d at 658.
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In separating the activities of the state and the power
company, the court's analysis failed to answer the question of
whether the state and the power company acted jointly.2' The
state first promulgated rules with which utilities had to com-
ply. In response to these rules the power company enacted their
own rules and filed them with the state. In accepting these
rules as conforming to the Administrative Code the state gave
tacit approval to the rules. Isn't this a "symbiotic ' 22 relation-
ship which would lead to a conclusion of state action? Accord-
ing to Lucas, the answer is no, but it is unfortunate that the
court did not explain why this joint activity did not constitute
state action or why the actions of the state were not viewed as
giving "apparent aid" to the power company. 23
The Lucas court affirmed Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Company2 where it held that the fact that the telephone com-
pany filed procedural rules with the state did not constitute
"state action." Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Edison Company5 was also reaffirmed by Lucas. The plaintiff
in Particular Cleaners was complaining about Common-
wealth's policy of requiring security deposits from select cus-
tomers who could not show prior credit. The plaintiff at-
tempted to distinguish Kadlec by arguing that the rules con-
cerning security deposits were not those of the utility, as they
had been in Kadlec, but that they were promulgated by the
Illinois Commerce Commission. The court rejected this argu-
ment noting that "the state did not act on its own regulation.
Edison executed its own policies, limited only by state regula-
tion. ' ' 21 The court also noted that the state did not benefit from,
encourage, request or cooperate in the decision to collect secu-
rity deposits. 27 In both Kadlec and Particular Cleaners the
21. 466 F.2d at 669. Judge Sprecher in his dissent noted that the state by investing
the utility with the power and authority to enter into the consumer's dwelling to
terminate electricity had become a "joint party" with the utility in resorting to self-
held procedures.
22. The concept of a symbiotic relationship as "state action" was developed in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961) and later dis-
cussed in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1972). See also Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3rd Cir. 1974).
23. See 466 F.2d at 658 (Judge Sprecher dissenting).
24. 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
25. 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1972).
26. Id. at 191.
27. Id.
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court noted that "the nexus between the state and defendant's
conduct was not sufficient to maintain an action under §
1983. ''2 Apparently, the court believed that there was nothing
resembling the "jointness" or "symbiotic" relationship which
had been present in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."
Driscoll v. Operating Engineers Local 139 11 did not arise in
the same context as the utility cases but presented the question
of whether extensive governmental regulation constitutes
"state action."
The plaintiff sought to force Local No. 139 of the Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers to discontinue the require-
ment that all candidates for a union office swear that they were
not Communists. In commenting on the argument that exten-
sive governmental regulation was "state action" the court
stated:
But governmental regulation or participation in some of the
affairs of unions does not consequently make every union
activity so imbued with governmental action that it can be
subjected to constitutional restraints.3'
The court stated that only if the "governmental activity signifi-
cantly encouraged" the promulgation and enforcement of the
anti-Communist oath was state action present."3" This was es-
sentially a restatement of the test enunciated in Lucas v. Wis-
consin Electric Power Company,33 i.e., that since the state is
not involved in the activity which actually caused the injury,
state action is not present.
In Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Company34 the plaintiffs
alleged that Heinemann had restaurant, cigarette and soft
drink licenses sufficient to establish the requisite "state ac-
tion." The court disagreed citing Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Company:31
But the 'mere fact that a business is subject to state
regulation does not by itself convert its actions into that of
28. Id.
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30. 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
31. Id. at 690.
32. Id. Accord, Golden v. Carpenters & Joiners, 67 F.R.D. 642 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
33. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). See note 16,
supra.
34. 402 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
35. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. .. .'
There must be 'a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as. that of the State
itself.'36
In the Heinemann case the court found the plaintiffs were un-
able to identify a "sufficiently close nexus" 3 between any state
regulation and Heinemann's refusal to serve women in the
"Men's Grill."
Another application of the "significant" test requiring state
involvement in the activity causing the injury is found in
Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology.3 8 In that case the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a private university, dis-
criminated against faculty women in their appointment, reten-
tion and compensation. The plaintiff alleged, among other con-
tentions, that I.I.T. was regulated by the state.
In analyzing the state's comprehensive regulation of the
school the court relied on Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis"9 and
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison0 in holding that "the mere
existence of detailed regulations of a private entity does not
make every act, or even every regulated act, of the private firm,
the action of the state."'" In order for state regulation of a
private business or institution to be of decisive importance in
the "state action" analysis it must be alleged that the regula-
tory agency has "encouraged the practice in question, or at
least given its affirmative approval to the practice. 42 The
circuit court held that the facts alleged in the complaint failed
to support a conclusion that the defendant acted "under color
of' state law. 3
Lucas and the other regulation cases discussed stand for the
proposition that "state action" is not present even when the
private person has a monopoly granted by the state, is heavily
regulated by the state, sets forth its own procedural regulations
as guided by the state's rules and contributes tax dollars to the
36. Id. at 350.
37. See note 16, supra.
38. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
39. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
40. 419 U.S. 345.
41. 524 F.2d at 826.
42. Id. at 826.
43. Id. at 827.
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
state. These decisions only define real or apparent "aid, com-
fort or incentive" in negative terms. Rather than indicating
what is "aid, comfort or incentive," the reader of these cases
is only told what it is not.
Even where the state is involved with the private person in
providing "aid, comfort, or incentive" the court looks to
whether the state is "significantly" involved in the activity
that caused the injury either in the state's contribution to the
effectiveness of the defendant's conduct or the state's defiance
of conflicting national policy..' When such a requirement is
present it becomes more difficult to establish state action. The
state may be intricately involved in the activities of a private
person but not with the particular act of which the plaintiff
complains.45
State Financial Support
In Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital" hospitals in Green
Bay, Wisconsin had refused to allow the use of their facilities
for an abortion for Jane Doe. The question presented was
whether the hospital had acted "under color of" state law. If
"state action" was present the hospital could not refuse the
abortion, 7 but if it was not present, the private hospital was
free to adopt its own policy on abortions."
The plaintiffs argued that the receipt of Hill-Burton Act49
funds and the subsequent compliance with government regula-
tions in order to retain the funds constituted "state action."
This argument was rejected and the court stated that "[t]here
is no evidence, however, that any condition related to the per-
formance or non-performance of abortions was imposed upon
the hospital" in order to receive or retain funds 0
The court stated that "[t]he facts that defendants have
44. See note 16, supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 88 to 93, infra.
46. 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
48. 479 F.2d at 760.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291Z. These same arguments were made and rejected in Doyle
v. Unicare Health Serv., Inc., Aurora Center, 399 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1975) and
Barrio v. McDonough District Hospital, 377 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Ill. 1974). But see
Suckle v. Madison General Hospital, 362 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Wis. 1973) where a
finding of "state action" was based on the hospital's articles of incorporation, by-laws,
customs and usages, contracts and sources of funds. See also Comment, State Action
in the Health Field, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1188.
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accepted financial support. . . from both the federal and state
governments . . .do not justify the conclusion that its con-
duct, which is unaffected by such support or such regulation,
is governed by section 1983. ' '5' The court then went on to quote
itself in the Lucas case emphasizing that the private person
must derive some "aid, comfort or incentive" from the state.
The plaintiff must have wondered how the granting of funds to
the hospital could not be seen as aid. Again the court applied
the "state action" test which requires that the state be signifi-
cantly involved in the activity that caused the injury.2
The Doe court stated that the facts were unlike those of
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital" in that "this
record does not reflect any governmental involvement in the
very activity which is being challenged. ' 54 But that was not the
standard required by the Simkins court. Nowhere was it stated
in Simkins that the government had to be involved in the activ-
ity that caused the injury, but rather the court stated the issue
as "whether the state or the federal government, or both, have
become so involved in the conduct of these otherwise private
bodies that their activities are also the activities of these gov-
ernments . . . . " The Simkins court then considered a num-
ber of factors which led to a conclusion of state action. These
included "[t]he massive use of public funds and extensive
state-federal sharing in the common plan"" which a state is
required to submit to the surgeon general setting forth a hospi-
tal construction program. Another factor which the Simkins
court found significant was that the defendant hospitals oper-
ated as integral parts of comprehensive joint state and federal
programs designed to properly allocate medical resources.57 It
also held that participation in the Hill-Burton program consti-
tuted a "state function" and therefore equal protection guaran-
tees applied. ' 8 Finally, the court viewed as an important factor
51. Id.
52. Id. See note 16 supra.
53. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
54. 479 F.2d at 761.
55. 323 F.2d at 966. Citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
56. Id. at 967.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 968. This is the equivalent of arguing that a public function is present.
For a discussion of public function as "state action" see text accompanying notes 129
to 147 infra.
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the fact that the challenged discrimination had been affirma-
tively sanctioned by the government. 9 This last factor was the
"governmental involvement in the very activity which is being
challenged" that the Doe court had discussed. But in Simkins
it was only one of a number of significant factors considered
rather than the key or deciding factor as it was in Doe. The Doe
court failed to address itself to the other factors.
The Doe court also relied on Bright v. Isenbarger," an ac-
tion brought by two students who had been allegedly dismissed
from a private parochial high school without due process. In
affirming the district court's decision the circuit court adopted
the district court's opinion.' The plaintiff argued that indirect
financial aid to the school through the grant of property tax
exemptions coupled with the regulation of educational stan-
dards by the state constituted state action. The court stated
that "[tihere can be no doubt that this supervision and tax
exemption constitute action by the state, but the question is
whether it constitutes the 'significant involvement' of the state
in the challenged activity . . .. "62 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument. It noted that the tax exemption was given
to a broad class of organizations and therefore was not signifi-
cant aid. It further noted that if the regulation of educational
standards constituted "state action" private education would
be effectively eliminated.13
In Pitts v. Department of Revenue of the State of
Wisconsin4 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state's grant of
tax exemptions to organizations which discriminated in their
membership on the basis of race on the ground that the tax
exemptions constituted "state action" which fostered discrimi-
nation. In analyzing the Pitts decision careful note should be
taken that this action was brought against the Department of
Revenue of the State of Wisconsin rather than against a private
person. 5 The plaintiffs in Pitts did not claim "that state action
59. Id.
60. 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
61. Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
62. Id. at 1396.
63. Id. at 1396 and 1397.
64. 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
65. Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Pri-
vate Activity, 74 COLUN. L. REv. 656, 694 (1974):
[Sluits against the private person and suits against government for injunctive
1976]
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fostering discrimination exists in this case because activities of
ostensibly private organizations have become impregnated
with a governmental character." 6
The Pitts court presented the issue in the alternative as
whether the defendant's granting of tax exemptions to organi-
zations which discriminate is "state action" fostering
discrimination or "whether the grant of tax exemptions with-
out inquiry into the policies of the organizations benefited is
merely an expression of neutrality with respect to those poli-
cies." In finding that "state action" was present 8 the court
distinguished three cases dealing with the grant of tax exemp-
tions which found that "state action" was not present. 9 It dis-
tinguished those cases on the ground that they had not in-
volved an equal protection claim. The district court was aware
that the Seventh Circuit court of appeals had an opportunity
to establish a less demanding standard of what constitutes
"state action" when racial discrimination was present, but had
refused to meet this issue. 0 In spite of this, the court stated
that "[i]nherent in our decision . . . is a determination that
a different standard must be applied to ascertain state action
in cases involving equal protection than in cases involving
other rights."7'
The "different standard" requires an examination of the
challenged conduct "both in light of the right it allegedly vio-
lates and in the light of the right under which it is asserted to
be proper.'" 2 "In making this examination it is crucial. . . that
relief should involve quite different considerations. The former require that
government's interest be significant enough to justify restricting the private
interest as well. But in suits against government, no private interest is at stake,
and thus none can be asserted to retard full relief against the state support.
66. 333 F. Supp. at 664.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 669. Specifically, the court found that the grant of a tax exemption to
private organizations which discriminate is "significant" state action "encouraging"
discrimination in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and must be enjoined.
69. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Clothing Workers v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
70. Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412, 413 (7th Cir. 1971). The district court had
stated "that only a handful of successful 'state action cases' ha[d] not involved
challenges to racial discrimination" and thought this might suggest that a less de-
manding standard ought to be applied when allegations of racial discrimination were
present. 314 F. Supp. at 1394.
71. 333 F. Supp. at 668.
72. Id. at 669.
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the prevention of racial discrimination is dominant in any bal-
ancing of constitutional interests."73
The Pitts court is not the only court that has applied a
different standard when equal protection questions are present.
Other courts have held that there is a dual state action stan-
dard: a less onerous test when discrimination is present and a
more rigorous standard for other claims.74 For example, in
Weise v. Syracuse University7 the court explained the ration-
ale for applying a different state action standard as "the pecu-
liar offensiveness of the state's taxing all citizens for objectives
from the benefits of which a particular category is arbitrarily
excluded or disadvantaged. ' 7 The Weise court continued:
Class-based discrimination is perhaps the practice most
fundamentally opposed to the stuff of which our national
heritage is composed, and by far the most evil form of dis-
crimination has been that based on race . . . . [In race
discrimination cases courts have been particularly vigilant in
requiring the states to avoid support of otherwise private dis-
crimination, and that where the conduct has been less offen-
sive a greater degree of tolerance has been shown.71
In Barrett, M.D. v. United Hospital7 the court explained
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975) rev'd
en banc, 44 LW 2493 (1976); Jackson v. Statlor Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.
1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society,
445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971) and Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind.
1970). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Mr. Justice
Brennan dissenting on other grounds) which stated:
The state action doctrine reflects the profound judgment that denials of
equal treatment, and particularly denials on account of race or color, are singu-
larly grave when government has or shares responsibility for them ....
[Slomething is uniquely amiss in a society where the government, the authori-
tative oracle of community values, involves itself in racial discrimination. Ac-
cordingly, in the cases that have come before us this Court has condemned
significant state involvement in racial discrimination . . . however subtle and
indirect it may have been and whatever form it may have taken. (emphasis
added).
In commenting on this quote the court in Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company,
466 F.2d 638, 656, n. 41 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) stated:
Mr. Justice Brennan would agree that the state involvement must be 'signifi-
cant.' It may well be that he would find that a lesser degree of state involvement
would satisfy the significance test when racial discrimination is involved.
75. 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
76. Id. at 405.
77. Id. at 406.
78. 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
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the application of the "double standard" test for state action.
The court stated that the Second Circuit applies a three-
pronged test to determine the existence of "state action." It
must be shown (1) that the state's involvement with the private
institution is significant, (2) that the state must be involved
not simply with some activity of the institution but with the
activity that caused the injury (the nexus requirement and (3)
that the state's involvement must aid, encourage or connote
approval of the complained of activity." However, the court
pointed out that two situations represent significant departures
from this test-in the situations where race discrimination is
alleged and in the "public function" cases." Where neither of
these exceptions are found applicable to the allegations in
plaintiff's complaint, the court will proceed to apply the three-
pronged test "keeping in mind. . . that it is the 'totality of the
circumstances' which must be considered in testing for the
presence of 'state action'. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority .. ."8 The Barrett court noted that the rationale
behind the exception to the application of the three-pronged
test in cases involving race discrimination may make the "less
onerous test" applicable to cases involving sex or age discrimi-
nation.82
Subsequently, in Girard v. 94th Street and Fifth Avenue
Corp.," the court applied the "less onerous test" in a case
involving alleged sex discrimination. The court departed from
the three-pronged test and more closely scrutinized whether
the alleged discrimination by the defendants was "impreg-
nated" with governmental approval. "Under the stricter stan-
dard, indirect governmental participation in the management
of an organization is persuasive evidence of the existence of
'state action' where the participation is both substantial and
other than neutral."84
One of the arguments that the plaintiff made in Cohen v.
Illinois Institute of Technology' was that the financial and
79. Id. at 797.
80. Id. at 797-98.
81. Id at 800.
82. Id. at 797, n. 26.
83. 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
84. Id. at 454-55, quoting Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 635 (2d Cir.
1974).
85. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
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other support which the defendant received from the state was
a factor leading to a conclusion of state action. The state sup-
ported I.I.T. through benefits from the state's eminent domain
powers; students were allowed to use state facilities in certain
study programs; students received loan guarantees and schol-
arships from the state and under the state grant program,
funds were provided directly to the school.
The court found that the school was "not so heavily depen-
dent on the state as to be considered the equivalent of a public
university for all purposes and in all its activities."86 The court
did find, however, that the state's support would have been
sufficiently significant to find "state action" had it been al-
leged that that support furthered the specific policies or con-
duct under attack."'
The above tests of Cohen suggest that the Seventh Circuit
may be developing a twofold approach to the question of
whether "state action" is present. It first examines whether the
private person was "so heavily dependent on the state as to be
considered the equivalent of a public [institution] for all pur-
poses and in all its activities." 8 For example, the court inti-
mates that if a "private university" were so heavily dependent
upon the state for support that it could not exist without such
support it might be considered a "public university for all pur-
poses." 9 Second, even if the private person was not so heavily
dependent on the state as to be considered a "public university
for all purposes and in all its activities," the court will conduct
a further examination to determine if state support has fur-
thered the specific policies or conduct under attack. If that is
the case, "state action" is present." However in Cohen there
was nothing in the complaint alleging that the state's assis-
tance lent any support to any act of discrimination.
86. Id. at 825. (footnote omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975) presented a
fact situation remarkably similar to Cohen. The Weise court stated:
"[Tlhe essential point [is] that the state must be involved not
simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have influenced
injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury."
(citations omitted).
However, the Second Circuit notes that this is only half of the inquiry. The
court must "look to the nature of the right infringed as well as the extent of the
state's involvement."
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The Cohen court suggested that if I.I.T. had been empow-
ered by the state to exercise the power of eminent domain
rather than merely receiving the benefits of the state's use of
that power a finding of "state action" might have been pro-
per.9
In discussing the funds contributed by the state the court
stated that they "represent[ed] only a small fraction of the
cost of educating the students for whom the grants are paid. '9 2
The implication of such a statement is that the amount of
funds that the state contributes as compared to an institution's
total operating budget is important in determining whether
there is "state action. '93
Bucha v. Illinois High School Association94 and Leffel v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association95 are two dis-
91. 524 F.2d at 825, n. 15, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
352-53 (1974).
92. 524 F.2d at 825.
93. The court stated in footnote 18 that in contrast to the present case:
[Tihe financial contributions by the state to the University of Louisville ("sub-
stantial financial support"), Brown v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000, 1001 (6th Cir.
1970); Temple University (up to 54.2% of the school's operating income), Isaacs
v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 385 F. Supp. 473, 479 (E.D. Pa.
1974); and the University of Pennsylvania (25% of the University's "hard core"
budget), Racklin v. University of Pennsylvania, supra n. 15, at 996-998, where
sufficient state involvement was found, were significantly greater than that
which could possibly be proven here. Nor is the extent of the state contributions
sufficiently in doubt so as to require a reversal of the dismissal of the complaint,
as was the case in Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, at 407 (2d Cir.
1975), and Braden-v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 6 (3rd Cir. 1973). 584
F.2d at 825, n. 18.
Thus the Cohen court distinguished itself from Weise. Since the extent of state contri-
butions was in doubt in Weise, the case had to be remanded. If that were the case in
Cohen, the above quote indicates a remand would be required. Again, the conclusion
that the amount of funds contributed by the state is important in determining state
action is emphasized. This seems to be a proper analysis for if a "private university"
derived 90", of its support from the state there would be no question that "state action"
was present. Likewise, if it only received 5%, "state action" would not be present. The
proper question then is what percentage equals "state action." See also Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). The Court stated:
[Diecisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private discrimina-
tion do not turn on whether the state aid adds up to 51 percent or adds up to
only 49 percent of the support of the segregated institution.
413 U.S. at 466, quoting Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275
F. Supp. 833, 854 (E.D. La. 1967).
94. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
95. 398 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wis. 1975). Accord, Fortin v. Darlington Little League,
Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975). Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,
367 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Wis. 1974) was a similar case which was dismissed as to the
athletic association because of a failure to allege any facts which would lead to a
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trict court cases where the courts were faced with the issue of
whether the rules of a private voluntary athletic association
which prohibited participation by women constituted "state
action." In Bucha the court held that since many members of
the athletic association were tax supported public institutions,
and since many of the association's sporting events were con-
ducted in facilities constructed and maintained at taxpayer
expense, "state action" was present. In Leffel the court distin-
guished Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital96 noting that there
was "a far more direct influence upon the school's athletic
programs by the [athletic association] than there was over the
hospital's policies by reason of the hospital's receipt of Hill-
Burton funds."97 Relying upon Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric
Power Co.9" the court found that "state action" was present.
C. State Enforcement
1. State Acting in Concert with Private Persons
The Supreme Court in United States v. Pricel9 held:
Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the pro-
hibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes
of the statute. To act "under color" of law does not require
that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that
he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or
its agents.11
conclusion of "state action." Apparently the law firm which represented the plaintiffs
in both cases .had alleged sufficient facts in the Leffel case so the opposite conclusion
could be reached.
Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3rd Cir. 1975) held that
the mere use of public parks by a private organization does not satisfy the "state
action" nexus test. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 573-74 (1974).
Quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Magill court
stated that "the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action. . . ." The court stated that this nexus would be
present if the state's involvement was "significant." Magill, supra at 1332, citing
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). The court examined the financial sup-
port given the defendant by the state and held that since it was de minimis this support
was not sufficiently significant to meet the nexus standard set out in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
96. 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 46 to 59 supra.
97. 398 F. Supp. at 750.
98. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
99. 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
100. Id. at 794. Also, the "under color of" provision in § 242 means the same thing
that it does in the civil counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
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In Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Company,'0' the court
applied the Price rationale to find "state action" where private
persons were "jointly engaged with state officials in the prohib-
ited practice."''1 2
The plaintiffs in Johnson sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. The defendant, a restaurant, had set aside a portion of
the restaurant for men only. The defendant sought and ob-
tained agreement with the city attorney and the police depart-
ment to establish procedures' 3 for handling complaints from
the defendant regarding disruption of its business by women
attempting to be served in the "men's grill."
On several occasions the plaintiffs seated themselves in the
"men's grill" and were refused service. On one of these occa-
sions the police were called. The plaintiffs gave their names to
the officers and were told to appear at the city attorney's office.
The court found sufficient "state action" in the fact that
defendant sought and obtained an agreement with the police
for the enforcement of its discriminatory policy coupled with
the actual implementation of that policy. 04 The effect of this
agreement was to encourage Heinemann's to continue discrimi-
nating since the power of the state was available for enforce-
ment. Thus, there was established sufficient involvement by
the state with the discriminatory policy.10 5
101. 402 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
102. Id. at 718.
103. If someone from Heinemann's contacted the police to inform them of a dis-
turbance or that people were seating themselves contrary to Heinemann's policy, the
employees would ask those persons to leave. If they refused, a police officer would take
their names so Heinemann's would take legal action. The prosecution of any complaint
would be undertaken by Heinemann's as the city refused to do so on its own initiative.
104. The court found the holding of the Supreme Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), squarely applicable to the Heinemann case. In that case
the Supreme Court said that the plaintiff would be entitled to relief under § 1983 if
she could prove that a Kress employee and a policeman somehow reached an under-
standing to deny plaintiff service in the Kress store, or to cause her subsequent arrest
because she was a white person in the company of Negroes.
The involvement of a state official in such a conspiracy plainly provides the
state action essential to show a direct violation of petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights, whether or not the actions of the police
were officially authorized, or lawful . . . .Moreover, a private party involved
in such a conspiracy even though not an official of the State, can be liable under
§ 1983. (citations omitted). 398 U.S. at 152.
105. Accord, Smith v. Brookshire Bros. Inc., 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975), wherein a
private store and the police acted in concert pursuant to a customary plan to detain
persons suspected of shoplifting. The Fifth Circuit found sufficient state involvement
to support an action under § 1983.
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In Hansen v. Ahlgrimm 0 the plaintiff alleged that a private
attorney acted "in concert" with a state court judge in seeking
an order to show cause and the issuance of an arrest warrant
for failure to comply. The court said that in view of "the ordi-
nary contacts of counsel and court incident to litigation, it may
be questioned whether these allegations are sufficiently specific
to constitute a claim of actionable conspiracy for the purpose
of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. '107 The court further said that the
plaintiff failed to show any overt acts by the defendant "rea-
sonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy!"',"
The court also stated:
[A]llegations of conspiracy between private persons and
public officials who are themselves immune from liability' 9
under the facts alleged are insufficient to establish liability
of the private persons under color of state law for purposes of
the Civil Rights Act."0
Generally, a private attorney, while participating in the
trial of a private state court action, is not considered to act
"under color of' state law,"' and is immune from civil liability
See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (Douglas, J.
dissenting) where it was pointed out that Pennsylvania had undertaken to regulate and
supervise the utility's conduct in servicing householders. This, Douglas felt, heavily
involved the state in termination procedures, particularly where "the state would
presumably lend its weight and authority to facilitate the enforcement of respondents'
published procedures." Jackson, supra at 362. For an example of state enforcement of
a utility's statutory right to collect under-charges see Wis. STAT. § 196.22, which
forbids discrimination in rate charges as specified in schedules filed by utilities with
the Public Utilities Commission. See also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. Berlin
Tanning & Mfg. Co., 275 Wis. 554, 83 N.W.2d 147 (1957), wherein the Wisconsin
Supreme Court implied that § 196.22 provided the utility with a statutory cause of
action for collection of undercharges in rates. The court said that the defenses of
estoppel and waiver could not be invoked against the utility company. It appears that
Wisconsin utilities have defense-proof statutory causes of action for collection of under-
charges in rates.
106. 520 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 770.
108. Id. at 770, quoting Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1969).
109. The court initially determined that Judge Ahlgrimm was immune from liabil-
ity under the Civil Rights Act.
110. 520 F.2d at 770.
111. Jones v. Jones, 410 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013
(1970), wherein the court said:
Lawyers who are not also parties in interest and are engaged in private
litigation on behalf of clients do not act under color of state law within the
meaning of 42 USC § 1983. Every litigant is entitled to a zealous advocate in
the presentation of his matters before the court. The state merely provides a
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under section 1983. This principle is grounded on social consid-
erations. The remedies guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act gen-
erally are not invoked against a private attorney in order to
avoid creating "a conflict between the attorney's duties to pro-
tect himself and to zealously represent his client.""' It is also
generally true that state court litigants are not amenable to
suit under section 1983 since the state merely provides a forum
and the actions of the litigants are not attributable to the
state. 
31
The Wisconsin Eastern District court found exceptions to
these rules in United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder."4 The
plaintiff in Schroeder sought injunctive relief and monetary
damages as compensation for losses sustained as a result of an
illegal garnishment action instituted in the county court. The
defendants were the plaintiff in the garnishment action and the
attorney who prosecuted the action in his behalf.
The issue, as stated by the court, was "whether under the
charges set out in this complaint, an attorney for a private
individual may be found to be acting under color of state law
by virtue of his institutions of prosecution of, and failure to
withdraw a patently unconstitutional garnishment proceed-
ing."" In answering this question in the affirmative, the court
recognized that attorneys usually are immune from civil liabil-
ity under section 1983 but nevertheless held that if the plaintiff
was able to prove bad faith or malice on the part of the defen-
forum for the litigants and although lawyers are considered 'officers of the
court', they are not officers of the state within the meaning of the Civil Rights
Act (citations omitted).
Accord, Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1963); Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520
F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1975); Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (private
attorney appointed as counsel for the accused plaintiff by a state court for an appeal
did not make attorney an officer of the court for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
112. United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Wis.
1975). Accord, Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
113. In Firnhaber v. Sensenbrenner, 385 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Wis. 1974), the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant caused his attorney to file a motion resulting in the
court's issuance of a temporary restraining order that restricted the distribution of the
plaintiff's political material for a brief period of time resulting in damages to the
plaintiff. The court noted that it was unclear whether such limited activity on the part
of the state could ever constitute "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "This is hardly more than a provision of the machinery
and forum for the hearing of private disputes, which is generally thought to be insuffi-
cient to constitute state action." 385 F. Supp. at 410.
114. 400 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
115. Id. at 716.
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dant attorney in the commencement of "a frivolous garnfsh-
ment action without substantial hope of success or other legiti-
mate purpose""' relief may be granted under section 1983. The
immunity protection was unavailable to an attorney in this
situation because it would not serve to implement the goal for
which it was established.
2. Actions Under State Statutes
In actions brought pursuant to state statute the courts have
usually found sufficient "state action" present to meet the req-
uisites of section 1983.
Judge Warren imputed "state action" to the plaintiff in the
garnishment action on the theory that it was only by statute
that the defendants in Schroeder had the authority to institute
the prejudgment garnishment.1 1 7 "This is not just action
against a backdrop of an amorphous state policy, but is instead
action encouraged, indeed only made possible by explicit state
authorization."'' 8 Further, the court held that where an attor-
ney brings and presses a suit which attributes "state action"
to the client the attorney is also engaging in "state action.""' 9
As a result of the defendant hotel proprietor's seizure of the
plaintiff's personal property for non-payment of rent pursuant
to the Illinois innkeeper's lien law,'20 the plaintiff in Collins v.
Viceroy Hotel Corp.'2' sought a declaratory judgment, injunc-
tive relief and damages. In finding the requisite "state action"
the court applied the rationale espoused by the Supreme Court
in Reitman v. Mulkey' 2  finding "state action" "where the state
by its affirmative action has made deprivations of due process
legally possible."' '
116. Id. at 717.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 716. The court cited McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397, 1399
(S.D. Ala. 1971):
[AI private citizen is acting under color of state law when his action is encour-
aged by state law and especially when it is possible only by virtue of state law.
In the instant case defendants were able to obtain a garnishment only because
of state law, therefore they were acting under color of state law.
119. See also discussion of an attorney's immunity from liability under § 1983, at
notes 106 to 113 supra.
120. ILL. Rav. STAT., 1969, Ch. 71, § 2, and Ch. 82, § 57. This statute authorized a
hotel proprietor to seize property of a hotel guest without any notice and without any
hearing, either before or after the seizure.
121. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
122. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
123. 338 F. Supp. at 394. See, e.g., Burke & Reber, State Action Congressional
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In a section 1983 action to enjoin the defendant from pro-
ceeding in a state public nuisance action against the plaintiff,
the court in Larkin v. Bruce'24 found that the defendant was
acting "under color of" state law. The defendant had acted
pursuant to section 280.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 5 which
authorized "a private person to institute an action by the state
in the public interest."'26
D. Public Function
The plaintiffs in Murphy v. Society of Real Estate
Appraisers121 were attempting to enjoin a disciplinary proceed-
ing which had been instituted by the defendants. The plaintiffs
argued that since Wisconsin had statutorily recognized the de-
fendants as a licensing authority for real estate appraisers,
"state action" existed. The State of Wisconsin, the plaintiffs
argued, delegated to the real estate society the task of deter-
mining who would be approved as an appraiser for purposes of
section 215.21(9) of the Wisconsin Statutes, 128 and that such a
delegation transformed the action of the private society into
that of the state.2 9 In determining whether the defendant per-
formed a public function the court noted that it must be guided
by the principles set forth in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. 130
The Jackson Court defined public function as "the exercise
by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved
Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 So. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1973). But see Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Forward: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
124. 352 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
125. Section 280.02, Wis. STATS., provides:
[An action to enjoin a public nuisance may be commenced and prosecuted in
the name of the state, either by the attorney general . . . or upon the relation
of a private individual, or a county, having first obtained leave therefor from
the court (emphasis added).
126. 352 F. Supp. at 1077.
127. 388 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
128. Wis. STAT. § 215.21(9) reads in pertinent part as follows: "APPRAISALS By
APPROVED APPRAISERS: WHEN REQUIRED.
(a) Appraisals of the real estate security shall be made by appraisers, approved by the
commissioner.
Real estate appraisers may be deemed approved in a number of ways. Approval
may be obtained by membership in "a recognized professional appraisal group, organi-
zation or society .... " See Wis. AD. CODE § S-L 18.05(1)(a).
129. 388 F. Supp. at 1050.
130. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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to the State" or as the exercise of a power traditionally asso-
ciated with sovereignty.13' The Jackson Court then went on to
hold that a public function was not present because the State
of Pennsylvania did not traditionally supply utility service."'
Relying on Jackson, the Murphy court held the defendants
were not performing an activity which is "traditionally asso-
ciated with sovereignty" and therefore "state action" could not
be found under a public function theory.'33 The appropriate
question as set forth in Jackson, which was given no more than
a pro forma answer in Murphy, was whether the approval of
appraisers by the real estate society was the exercise of a power
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the state." The court an-
swered no but did not explain why. Appraisals of real estate
security are made by appraisers approved by the state.'34 Ap-
praisers are approved by the state if they are members of the
real estate appraisers society. Thus, the society has the actual
power of deciding who will or will not be approved by the state
and this seems to be a power "traditionally associated with
sovereignty." A reading of Murphy does not explain what is
wrong with the above reasoning.'35
United States v. Hoffman'36 did not specifically discuss
whether the private person performed a public function but the
principles which apply in the public function area were applied
by the court. The court held that privately employed railroad
policemen who were vested with the powers of city policemen
131. 419 U.S. at 352-53.
132. Id. at 353. In his dissent in Jackson, Justice Marshall had no difficulty in
finding that a public function was being performed and therefore that "state action"
was present.
The Court concedes that state action might be present if the activity in question
were 'traditionally associated with sovereignty,' but it then undercuts that point
by suggesting that a particular service is not a public function if the State in
question has not required that it be governmentally operated. This reads the
'public function' argument too narrowly. The whole point of the 'public func-
tion' cases is to look behind the State's decision to provide public services
through private parties (citations omitted). In my view, utility service is tradi-
tionally identified with the State through universal public regulation or owner-
ship to a degree sufficient to render it a public function. 419 U.S. at 371.
133. 388 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
134. Wis. STAT. § 215.21(9) (1973).
135. In relying on Jackson,' the court may have been unaware of the following
language from Justice Marshall's dissent in that case. "Today the court. . . adopts a
stance that is bound to lead to mischief when applied to problems beyond the narrow
sphere of due process objections to utility terminations." 419 U.S. at 366.
136. 498 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1974).
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acted "under color of' state law. In so holding the court viewed
as important the fact that "a continuing delegation of the law
enforcement power of the state"'' 7 was present. This delegation
of the law enforcement power of the state was the delegation
of a power traditionally associated with sovereignty.138
In Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology3 ' the plaintiffs
had argued that I.I.T., in providing higher educational serv-
ices, was engaged in a traditionally public function. The court
noted that this argument had been routinely rejected in private
college and university cases. 4" The plaintiff had added a new
twist to the usual contention that education is a public func-
tion by arguing that Illinois had declared higher education to
be a public function in the preamble of the Educational Facili-
ties Authority Act of 1969. This argument fared no better than
previous education-is-a-public-function arguments. The court
stated: "Illinois' recent declaration of the importance of higher
education can scarcely convert I.I.T.'s activities into 'powers
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.' "1,
When the Illinois Migrant Council, the plaintiff in Illinois
Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co.,14 2 attempted to speak
to the defendant's employees who resided at the company's
residential community of Prince Crossing, Illinois, the defen-
dant refused them access to the town. The plaintiff brought an
action to compel the defendant to permit them access to the
farmworkers and for damages. The plaintiff alleged federal ju-
risdiction based on section 1983. The Seventh Circuit found the
requisite "state action," relying on the theory of Marsh v.
Alabama,4 3 in that the complaint alleged sufficient facts'44
137. Id. at 881.
138. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974), and text
accompanying notes 130 to 135 supra.
139. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
140. Id. at 826, n. 24. The court cited the following cases: Blackburn v. Fisk Univer-
sity, 443 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1971); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969);
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp.
494, 497 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Furomoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1971); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D. N.Y.
1968). Contra, Belk v. Chancellor of Washington University, 336 F. Supp. 45, 49 (E.D.
Mo. 1970).
141. 524 F.2d at 826-27, n. 24, quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. at 352.
142. 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975).
143. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The Supreme Court in Marsh found that the company
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upon which it could be concluded that the defendant's town of
Prince Crossing was a company town. The circuit court con-
cluded that size alone is not determinative of whether a town
has sufficient public residential characteristics as to constitute
state action but rather the question is whether the town "serves
as a functional equivalent of a municipality for its residents."'45
The court said:
[P]roperty otherwise private, upon which the public is in-
vited for certain limited and designated purposes doe not
come under the rule of Marsh v. Alabama, for such property
cannot be thought of as being a "company town." Private
commercial property, such as a shopping center, is not a resi-
dential community; there is thus no resemblance to a "com-
pany town."' 4'
However, the court found that Prince Crossing had the
characteristics of a municipality and served as a functional
equivalent of a normal town to its inhabitants, thus a "com-
pany town" within the meaning of Marsh. Accordingly, when
the defendant acted it did so "under color of' state law. 47
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has not looked favorably on claims of
"state action." One explanation of this may be the fact that in
expanding the "state action" concept the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with a series of cases which presented
the "state action" question in the context of a "private per-
son's" discrimination based on race. The Seventh Circuit, in
establishing "state action" boundaries has not been faced with
the racial discrimination cases. The Seventh Circuit has not
possessed "all the characteristics of any other American town."
144. The complaint alleged:
ITihat the company operated a residential community for 150 persons provid-
ing them with the basic facilities needed, including a work place, residence, a
store, a cafeteria and a recreational building. . . . [The company enforced a
no-trespass policy, from which it would be quite reasonable to infer that the
company had some means of enforcing its no-trespass rules. It would.further
seem reasonable to infer that a community of 150 persons, located some miles
from any other town, must have some means of protecting itself from crime and
fire, and must have some means of disposing of its sewage. Illinois Migrant
Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 319, 395 (7th Cir. 1975).
145. 519 F.2d at 394, quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
146. 519 F.2d at 395.
147. Id.
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formally adopted the dual standard approach to "state ac-
tion," i.e., that a less onerous test for establishing "state ac-
tion" is used when racial discrimination is alleged.'48 But the
rigorous standard it has applied may implicitly recognize the
existence of a dual standard. 4 '
Another explanation is that the Seventh Circuit has repeat-
edly applied a "state action" test requiring that the state be
involved in the activity that caused the injury. While other
courts have used such a test, it has usually been one of a num-
ber of factors considered in determining whether "state action"
was present rather than the sole or primary test.5 ' In relying
on the "activity that caused the injury" test, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has often failed to answer the fundamental question of
whether the "private person" was sufficiently entwined with
the state or performing a function such that the activity had
to be viewed as that of the state. 5' Also, when considering a
number of different factors which have been alleged to consti-
tute "state action" Seventh Circuit courts have considered the
allegations sequentially and have failed to analyze whether
cumulatively the relevant factors constitute "state action."'52
Only recently in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology"3
has the Seventh Circuit suggested that it may consider as de-
terminative of the presence of "state action" the test of
whether a private person is so heavily dependent on the state
as to be considered the equivalent of the state. Cohen suggests
that if this test is met, "state action" is present and the court
need not consider whether the state's support of the private
person has furthered the specific policies or conduct under at-
148. See, e.g., Barrett v. United Hospital, 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
149. See Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 656 (1972), where the
court used as one measurement of "significant" state support, a state's "defiance of
conflicting national policy." Note 41 states:
For example, the fundamental value "of erasing racial discrimination in all its
forms seems to underlie Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Moose
Lodge ....
Mr. Justice Brennan would agree that the state involvement must be 'signifi-
cant.' It may well be that he would find that a lesser degree of state involvement
would satisfy the significance test when racial discrimination is involved.
150. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974); Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
151. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
152. See note 17 supra.
153. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
tack."'4 If this analysis reflects the approach taken by the Sev-
enth Circuit, a more realistic view of state action may evolve.
For if a "private person" cannot exist independent of state
support (monopoly support, financial, eminent domain, etc.),
then the state is implicitly involved in the activity that caused
the injury and "state action" should be found.
In certain instances the Seventh Circuit examines only the
single contact of the state with the private person in order to
find "state action" as where state officials act in concert with
"private persons" to implement actions in violation of the
fourteenth amendment; and where a state statute has author-
ized a cause of action which would not otherwise exist.
In cases where the "private person" exercises "powers" tra-
ditionally exclusively reserved to the state, the Seventh Circuit
has found "state action" without analysis of the degree or na-
ture of the state contact with the "private person."
BARBARA MAIER
GREGORY M. WEYANDT
154. Id. at 825.
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